State of Utah v. Gary Alred Mitcheson : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1976
State of Utah v. Gary Alred Mitcheson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dow Blackham; Blackham and Roley; Attorneys for Appellants;
Vernon D. Romney; Attorney General;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Mitcheson, No. 14629 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/411
n: THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UT.7.1.H I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
GARY ALFRED MITCHESON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
case No. 
14629 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL 
JR. I JUDGE 
FILED 
NOV 12 1976 
Clar~. Supreme Court, Utah 
DON BLACKHAM 
BLACKHAM AND BOLEY 
3535 South 3200 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
~' Attorneys for A~pellant 
----·--
COUNTY, 
Attorneys 
84119 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CA:.>E--------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT-------------------- 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
REFUSED TO GIVE APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 
BASED ON THE DEFENSE OF 
JUSTIFICATION----------------- 5 
CONCLUSION---------------------------------------- 9 
CASES CITED 
Singleton v. State, 522 P.2d 1221 (Nevada 1974)--- 9 
State v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 
(1969)----------------------------------------- 6 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 
(1947)----------------------------------------- 6 
State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 144 P.2d 290 
(1943)----------------------------------------- 6 
State v. Rio, 38 Wash. 2d 446, 230 P.2d 308 
(1951)----------------------------------------- 8 
S"'ATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-405, 1953, as amended------- 5,6,8 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
14629 
GARY ALFRED MITCHESON, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Murder in the Second 
Degree in the shooting death of Richard Herrera at Price, 
Utah, on February 7, 1976. 
The case was tried in the District Court of 
Carbon County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Edward 
Sheya, sitting with a jury; on April 23, 1976 a verdict 
of guilty of Murder in the Second Degree was returned 
against the appellant. From that verdict, appellant 
appeals. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison to serve a term of five years to life by the 
Honorable Edward Sheya. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the conviction was 
proper and should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 15, 1975, Ernie Herrera, younger 
brother of the shooting victim, Richard Herrera, sold 
his 1967 Chevrolet Van to Alfred Mitcheson, father of 
appellant Gary Mitcheson (T.11-12). According to Ernie 
Herrera, the mag wheels were not included in the sale, 
the consideration for which was a reduction in the selling 
price from $600.00 to $300.00; however, Ernie Herrera 
agreed to loan the mag wheels to appellant for use on 
the van. The mag wheels were mounted on the Mitcheson 
van the same day as the sale (T.12-13). 
On several subsequent occasions in January 
1976, Ernie Herrera requested that his mag wheels be 
returned, but his requests were ignored (T.14). Finally 
Ernie Herrera, his brother Richard, and several friends 
-2-
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appeared at the home of Alfred Mitcheson and began 
removing the mag wheels from the van that Ernie 
Herrera had sold to Mitcheson (T.22,219-220). Officer 
Tilton, responding to a call from Alfred Mitcheson, 
arrived nt the Nitcheson home and ordered Ernie 
Herrera, Richard Herrera, and their friends, Mike 
Manzanares and Louis Grant, to put the wheels and 
tires back on the van, suggesting that they go to 
court to resolve any issue over the ownership of the 
mag wheels and tires (T.22, 219-222). 
Late in the evening of February 6, 1976, 
another confrontation took place at the Taco Time drive-
in in Price, Utah, during which the decedent struck 
appellant (T.28,222-223). After the participants 
separated and left the drive-in, another meeting 
occurred at the residence of Jerry Giraud approximately 
two hours later. Appellant, his sister, and several 
friends ob~erved Richard Herrera's car parked at the 
Giraud residence. They parked their cars and appellant 
told his sister Debbie to "go in and tell Richard if 
he wanted to fight me, come outside and fight me." 
(T.:25). Eventually, appellant entered the Giraud 
residence but the decedent refused to fight (T.226). 
However, arrangements were made for the two to fight at 
two o'clock that afternoon (T.226). 
-3-
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Appellant and Wendell Johnson dropped off 
their other friends in town; the two drove to Alfred 
Mitcheson's home, where appellant picked up the 
rifle with which Richard Herrera was to be shot. 
Appellant told his father he was staying at Debbie's 
house that night. He drove back to town, met Albert 
Dicaro, arranged for a card game at Debbie's house, 
and arrived at his sister's house sometime after 
2:00 a.m. (T.227-228). 
Meanwhile, the decedent, Richard Herrera, 
gathered some of his friends to go to Debbie's 
house and remove from the van the mag wheels and 
tires which he claimed were his brother Ernie's (T. 51, 
160-161, 167-168). At approximately 3:30 a.m. the 
decedent and his several friends proceeded to the 
house at 432 South Fourth East, where appellant's 
sister Debbie lived (T.161). Before they could remove 
the tires, Miss Mitcheson came out onto the lighteJ 
front porch and ordered the group to get off her 
property (T.162). As Richard Herrera and his friends 
stood in the front yard, appellant grabbed his rifle, 
o;::"!ned the front door and fired his gnr, from the 
doorway, instantly striking--Richard Herrera, who died 
moments later from a gaping neck wound (T.162,258-259). 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GIVE 
APPELLi'_c;T' s REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTimr BASED ON THE 
DEFENSE OF JUSTIFICATION. 
Appellant, by his Requested Jury Instruction 
No. 15, requested that the trial court present one 
of the theories of his case, use of deadly force in 
defense of his habitation, to the jury for its con-
sideration. The trial court refused to give the 
requested instruction, and exception was taken by 
defense counsel (T.328). 
The requested instruction was a verbatim 
expression of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, 1953, as 
amended, which provides: 
"A person is justified in using 
force aaainst another when and to 
the ext~nt th~: he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent 
or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation; 
however, he is justified in the use 
of force which is intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury only 
if: 
(1) the entry is made or attempted 
in a violent and tumultuous manner 
and he reasonably believes that the 
entry is attempted or made for the 
purpose of assaulting or offering 
personal violence to any person, dwelling 
or being therein and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the assault or 
offer of personal violence or; 
-5-
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(2) He reasonably believes that 
the entry is made or attempted for 
the purpose of committing a felony 
therein and that such force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of 
the felony." 
Respondent acknowledges that under appropriate 
ci.:.·..::ums"":ances, fai2..ure to give this inst:::-uction would 
be reversible error, in accordance with the holdings 
of the line of cases cited by appellant. However, 
the circumstances which would warrant such an instruction 
are not present in the instant case. 
According to State v. Newton, 105 Utah 561, 
144 P.2d (1943), each party is entitled to have his 
theory of the case which is supported by competent 
evidence submitted to the jury. In State v. Johnson, 
112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), this court held 
that an appropriate instruction on a theory of the case 
is required if there be any substantial evidence to 
justify giving such an instruction. In the final 
case cited by appellant, State v. C~stillo, 23 U~ah 
2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969), the court reaffirmed the 
propriety of the substantial evidence test. 
Under this standard the trial record needed 
to contain substantial evidence which would tend to 
put the events of the early hours of February 7th within 
the parameters of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405, 1953, as 
amended. An analysis of the events as related to the 
-6-
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--
statutes demonstrates clearly that justification in 
defense of habitation was neither a viable nor a 
supportable defense in the instant case. Even if, 
arguendo, this court accepted that for purposes of 
thi3 st~tute, appellant's habitation that evening was 
his sister's home, although he was merely staying the 
night, appellant could not surmount other obstacles: 
1. As the decedent and his friends were 
huddled in the vicinity of the van in the yard of the 
home, it was unreasonable for appellant to assume 
that the home itself was about to be invaded. What 
was reasonable to assume was that the persons in 
the yard had come to remove the mag wheels and tires, 
as they had tried to do on a previous occasion. No 
violent overtures were made by any members of the 
Herrera group toward the home or toward any of the 
persons therein. 
2. Altho~~~ the Herrera grou? may 6ave been 
trespassing on the Mitcheson property by refusing to 
leave the yard, the record supplies no evidence to 
meet the statute requirement that there be an unlawful 
:oen+:ry into or attack upon t:te habitation. The home and 
not the yard was the habitation. 
3. Because deadly force was used, the statute 
requires in those cases that the entry or attempted entry 
be made in a "violent or tumultuous manner". Again 
appellant could off er no evidence to support this Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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theory since there was neither an entry nor an 
attempted entry. 
4. In addition to the violent entry require-
ment, the statute further demands that such entry 
be made or attemD::ed in order to physically harm persons 
therein or to commit a felony within the habitation. 
Although the decedent, Richard Herrera, had agreed 
to fight the appellant later in the day, appellant 
was unable to offer competent evidence that the 
decedent was attempting to violently enter the 
residence to harm anyone or to commit a felony 
therein. The attempted removal of the wheels and 
tires from a van in the yard of the home would not 
meet the statutory requirement of felony "therein". 
In light of this analysis, respondent's 
position is that appellant failed to meet the 
substantial evidence standard by being outside 
th2 parameters of Utai-1 Code Ann. § 76-2-405, 1953, 
as amended, making inapplicable and inappropriate 
Prepared Jury Instruction No. 15. 
Other jurisdictions have considered this 
issue of presenting theories to the jury, and their 
comments are helpful here. In State v. Rio, 38 Wash. 
-8-
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2d 446, 230 P.2d 308 (1951), the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that the court is not required to 
submit instructions to the jury on every theory 
requested by a defendant; and although the court 
will not pass on the weight or credibility of 
defendant's evidence, assuming that it is all true, 
defendant still must make a prima facie case as 
a matter of law to entitle him to instructions 
on the theory requested. In the instant case, no 
prima facie case was established. 
In a 1974 Nevada case, Singleton v. State, 
522 P.2d 1221, the court held that an instruction 
need not be given where there is no proof in the 
record to support it. 
These decisions support the trial court's 
refusal to include the justification instruction 
in its cl1~rge ~o the jur?, as th~re '"73.S :10 competent, 
substantial evidence tending to support that proposi-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant had failed to offer any 
substantial evidence supporting his theory of justi-
fication in the defense of habitation, the trial 
-9-
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court properly refused to give appellant's requested 
Jury Instruction No. 15. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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